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Over the past century, land use planning by regulatory agencies
has increasingly displaced the decentralized process of private
landowners making their own decisions about land use. Local
governments, county governments, state governments, and, to an
increasing extent, the federal government are all requiring private
landowners to modify their plans in order for their land to conform to
government plans. Increasingly, such plans are justified as necessary
to protect the environment, which extends their reach beyond
traditional land use concerns like protecting residential neighbor-
hoods from commercial intrusions.'
These steps are justified by the need to account for the public
interest in preserving endangered species, protecting the environment,
coordinating land use in crowded urban centers, preventing urban
sprawl, and curbing countless other alleged environmentally
destructive ills.' Only by imposing planning, so the argument goes,
can the land use be rationalized to prevent destructive, self-interested
behavior from creating a sterile series of concrete suburbs populated
only by strip malls and sidewalk-less neighborhoods. Unfortunately,
the increased scope and complexity of planning has reduced the
clarity and certainty of property rights in land without necessarily
accomplishing its goals. As the traditional rights of landowners
become more dependent upon planners' approval, property rights
increasingly resemble feudal tenures rather than the traditional
common law notions of property rights.
At the same time as planning increases its reach over private land
use decisions, the planning model has fallen into disrepute in the
economy generally. The experience of the twentieth century suggests
that the use of decentralized markets, not central planners, is the
superior means of social coordination. Planned economies on the
right (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy) and the left (the former Soviet and
1. To take just two recent examples from opposite ends of the country: see, e.g., Earl
Blumenauer, Entrepreneurial Environmentalism: A New Approach for The New Millennium, 29
ENvm. L. 1, 2 (2000) (praising Oregon's comprehensive land use planning); Patricia E. Salkin,
The Politics ofLand Use Reform in New York Challenges and Opportunities, 73 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1041 (1999) (noting that "New York must, however, recognize and articulate the rela-
tionship between sound land-use planning and controls with the environment, economic
competitiveness, housing, public infrastructure, and quality of life.").
2. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Planning Gain, Exactions, and Impact Fees: A Comparative
Study ofPlanningLaw in England, Wales and the United States, 32 URB. LAW. 21, 34-35 (2000)
(describing U.S. planning regime's role in environmental regulation); see also John M. DeGrove,
Sustainable Communities: The Future Direction for Managing Growth in Florida, LAND USE
INSTITurE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION SCI0
ALI-ABA 605, 609 (Aug. 14, 1997) (describing Florida Department of Community Affairs
regulatory program).
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eastern bloc countries, Communist China, North Korea, Cuba) either
collapsed or are collapsing.
The obvious question thus presents itself: is land use planning
fundamentally different from other forms of central planning? If so,
does that difference suggest that land use planning will succeed where
other forms of central planning failed? We conclude that land use
planning is not fundamentally different from other forms of economic
central planning. Further, the working of the market economy, and
the long-term success of America's economy, is intertwined in the
clear and certain rights and responsibilities generated by the common
law of property. The complexity of the modem world does not
diminish the need for private property; indeed, it strengthens its
imperative. Returning to a feudal conception of property is bad for
personal freedom, bad for civil society, and bad for the environment.
The last part of the foregoing bears particular emphasis. Too
often, defense of property rights is linked to a rejection of socially
laudatory goals. Protecting property rights does not mean acquiescing
in the destruction of the environment, the blighting of urban
landscapes, or callous disregard for the suffering of others. Property
rights, along with markets and the common law, make up an
institution that is quite successful at not only allowing but facilitating
such goals and has long been recognized as such. For example,
historian Richard Pipes notes that "early [Christian] church
theoreticians saw property as 'another disciplinary institution intended
to check and counteract the vicious disposition of men."' 3  Our
argument here is not that rights should be protected to privilege the
few, but that the failure to protect property rights will not only
impoverish the many but harm the environment as well. Note also
that our argument is not simply that planning has been a tool of brutal
totalitarian regimes, but that even a pure democratic system run by
benevolent wise persons has deep flaws that prevent it from achieving
its stated aims.
In Part I we briefly describe the nature of common law property
rights rules. In Part II we examine the corrupted form of property
rights, which we label "administrative property," developing today
through application of the planning model to land use. In Part III we
explore how common law property rights work better than the
corrupted modem version for resolving the contemporary problems
planning attempts to address.
3. RiCHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM 16-17 (1999).
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I. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN LAND
Perhaps more than any other branch of the common law, Anglo-
American property law grew out of the history of the struggle
between English monarchs and aristocracy for control of England. In
this section we briefly describe the origins of common law property
rights and compare them to the rights created by government fiat.
A. Common Law Property Rights and Fiat Rights
The law of real property in the United States traces to the
Norman Conquest of England in 1066. William the Conqueror,
having seized England by defeating Harold II at Hastings, now faced
the problem of holding and exploiting his new realm. The Anglo-
Saxon landed class had been defeated, but England was still a
conquered and potentially hostile land that required military
occupation.' William also needed to keep his Norman allies loyal.
He solved both problems by claiming the land in the Kingdom as his.7
He then granted rights to use land to key supporters in exchange for
continued military services.' It was William's intent that his lords
only be tenants and that their land would revert to the crown upon the
death of a lord or if military services were not rendered.9 Landholders
would thus be dependent on the King for their wealth and so have an
incentive to remain loyal.
The aristocracy had other ideas. Land was their major form of
wealth and they wished for their heirs to inherit their lands and for
their land to be alienable. Through their legal and political struggles
with the monarchy, that eventually became the common practice.
Thus, over the centuries, through legal conflicts between lords and
monarchs, the law evolved into the common law of property we know
today.10 Persons other than the one who wears the crown can own
land.
The components of today's American property law thus
originated in legal conflicts between England's aristocracy and
4. Id. at 126-30.
5. Id. at 126.
6. Id.
7. See id.
8. See A.W.B. SaIPSON, A HISrORY OF THE LAND LAW 3-4 (2d ed. 1986).
9. See id. at 3 ("Norman administrators did have a theory of tenure, and applied it
universally; all land whatsoever was held of some lord, and ultimately of the Crown."); see also
Pu's, supra note 3, at 106 ("In theory, under the regime of lordship and vassalage, all land
belonged to the sovereign and everyone else held it conditionally.").
10. See Piwas, supra note 3, at 106-07.
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monarchs. Covenants and servitudes, easements and profits, the fee
simple absolute and the tenancy in common-the basics of property
law today-all grew out of the same system that required one lord to
hold his majesty's head while the King vomited during sea voyages
and another to perform "a leap, a whistle and a fart coram domino
rege" each Christmas Day.1'
How can legal rules devised by such a system be other than
archaic and obsolete? Many modem courts and legislatures think the
common law rules of property are obsolete. Confronted with seeming
"technicalities" in property law, modem judges often argue that the
law should not be "constricted by feudal forms of conveyancing.""l
Throwing off feudal-era shackles rids the law of burdensome
technicalities and rationalizes the structure of rules. At the same time,
legislatures and regulatory agencies take steps to correct problems
caused by individuals' failure to conform to regulators' views of how
the land should be used. As a result, legislatures impose planning
requirements and authorize regulatory burdens to ensure that property
owners properly conform their activities to the central plan.13 William
the Conqueror's vision of property rights as feudal tenures ultimately
gave way to a complex and nuanced set of property rules that
provided guarantees of personal liberty in place of the dependence on
the king that William had sought to create. 4 One key distinction
between common law property rights and feudal tenure fights is thus
that property rights belong to private parties and are not "held of' a
superior."5
A second important distinction lies in the negative and positive
character of common law and feudal rights. Common law property
rights are negative rights; that is, they define the ability to exclude
others from participating in decisions about how resources are used.16
Thus our property fights in our homes allow us to prevent you from
moving in with either of us, but say nothing about whether our houses
are "adequate" or whether you have to contribute to paying for
renovations that will make them so. Feudal tenures (which can be
framed as the king's "right" to have you hold his head while he
vomits on sea voyages), on the other hand, had elements of positive
11. SmpSON, supra note 8, at 6.
12. Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 498 P.2d 987, 989 (Cal. 1972). But see
Estate of Thomson v. Wade, 509 N.E.2d 309,310 (N.Y. 1987) (reaffirming common law rule on
grounds of protecting reliance interest of those who acted on the basis of the rule).
13. See PipS, supra note 3.
14. See id. at 129-30.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 131-32.
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rights. Similarly, many modem rights, such as the right to subsidized
medical care, make demands on others. Your right to subsidized
health care requires us to contribute to paying your doctors' bills,
something that may conflict with our rights to (or ability to acquire)
adequate housing. Putting rights in conflict, as is inevitable with
positive rights, results in a reduction of the strength of the rights
claims. This is true with general claims (the right to subsidized
medical care) but is a particular problem for positive rights
concerning specific pieces of land, where competing uses cannot be
excluded.
A negative property right in land is absolute: the owner may
prohibit all the world from making any use of the piece of property in
question. A positive right to another's land, by contrast, cannot be
absolute. If we have the right to have you maintain a particular
habitat for an endangered species and the right is absolute, we no
longer hold a right in your land; we own your land. Once a need for a
tradeoff is recognized, however, no one's rights in the property are
"rights;" they are merely factors to be weighed and considered by an
ultimate decision maker.
Property rights differ from positive rights in another important
way: property rights are independent of the state. 7 For example,
while the Constitution created the framework for government,
expressly limited the powers of government, and provided safeguards
against invasions of certain rights, the Constitution did not grant us
the rights we have as citizens but recognized pre-existing rights."
Property rights' independence of centralized government authority,
for example, can be seen in the experience of nineteenth century gold
miners in the American West.19 Finding themselves in areas with no
government authority, Gold Rush miners, drawn from virtually every
comer of the globe, immediately began creating private systems
among themselves to allocate and protect property rights. Similarly,
Harold Demsetz documented the rise of property rights among eastern
17. Governments, of course, possess eminent domain powers and so may take property if
they compensate the owner. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127-
28 (1985); Miss. & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403,406 (1878).
18. See JOHN R. UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS WITH APPLICATION TO THE
CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH (1981); Andrew P. Morriss, Miners, Vigilantes, & Cattlemen:
Overcoming Free Rider Problems in the Private Provision of Law, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV.
581 (1998).
19. See generally UMBECK, supra note 18 (describing the evolution of property rights
during the California Gold Rush and noting that property rights that were initially solidified
through violence and private contractual arrangements were later formalized through legislation);
Morriss, supra note 18, at 581.
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Native American tribes when the fur trade made developing the rights
worth the costs." Likewise, Terry Anderson has shown that Native
Americans in the west often held property rights as individuals.21
Common law property rights also differ in another crucial
dimension from "rights" created by government fiat. The common
law is an evolutionary process, one which gradually sharpens
definitions over time in response to the facts of disputes.2 Fiat rights,
on the other hand, are shaped by the political process and so subject to
sharp discontinuities in content. 3  Thus the "right" to welfare
benefits, a central part of the "new property" championed by former
Yale Law School professor Charles Reich,24 underwent major changes
over the decades following the courts' acceptance of Reich's
arguments before its demise in the 1990s' welfare reform.2
The dominant metaphor for property rights, a bundle of sticks,
suggests a final crucial difference between property rights and fiat
rights. As the world changes and generally becomes more complex,
people discover new opportunities and problems that require
reallocation of existing property rights. By allowing parties to
combine and recombine individual sticks from the bundle in response
to their evaluation of their needs, property law adapts to the modem
world. Indeed, it is its remarkable ability to evolve that has enabled a
20. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347,351-
53 (1967).
21. TERRY L. ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS? AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF AMERICAN INr)A S (1997).
22. See JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITrEN AND THE UNWRITTEN LAW:
AN ADDRESS 28 (1889) ("Mhe procedure of making or declaring the law of private transactions
... consists simply in the examination, arrangement, and classification of human actions
according to the legal characteristics which they exhibit."); see also F.A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LmERTY: THE MIRAGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 115-22 (1973) (describing the
evolutionary nature of law); BRUNO LEONi, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 58-94 (1991).
23. Consider, for example, the differences in the content of welfare "rights" before and
after the welfare reform of the 1990s. Before the reform, welfare recipients held a protected
property interest in their benefits. After the reform, welfare recipients had no such interest. See
Melissa K. Scanlan, The End of Welfare and Constitutional Protections for the Poor: A Case
Study of the Wisconsin Works Program and Due Process Rights, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
153, 154 (1998).
24. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733-46 (1964).
25. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 328 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 262 n.8 (1970) ("It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
'property' than a 'gratuity' .... We are living in a society where one of the most important forms
of property is government largesse which some call the 'new property."' (citing Reich)) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Ironically, Justice Douglas also called upon Reich's article for support of the
proposition that protecting government benefits as property and making them dependent on the
whims of bureaucrats would make them resemble feudal tenures. See Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of
Durham, 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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set of legal rules and concepts originating in medieval England to
remain useful and relevant almost 1,000 years later.
No one would think of describing a statute as a bundle of sticks,
however, and individuals are certainly not allowed to opt in and out of
individual statutory provisions. Statutes are commands; commands
ultimately backed by the threat of force. Commands are many things
but they are not flexible. One command may be displaced by a new
command, but following a command (or, at least, a command with
content) requires obedience, not flexibility. The difference can be
seen clearly by comparing the number of three-hundred-year-old
statutes still enforced today with the number of still extant common
law rules.
The difference between rigid and flexible principles for property
use is one way to characterize the distinction between centralized
statutory schemes for regulating land use and the decentralized
common law of property and markets. A truly rigid property use
scheme would likely impose extremely high costs. Modem land use
planning schemes therefore incorporate relief valves to return some
flexibility to the system. For the same reason that income taxes are
not made "flexible" by allowing individual taxpayers to opt out of,
say, the top marginal tax bracket, this flexibility cannot be given
directly to land owners. Just as the wealthy would simply choose a
lower marginal tax rate, so too would land owners defeat the scheme
whenever it threatened their ability to make use of their land.
Instead the flexibility is built into the land use regulatory scheme
by providing balancing tests, multifactor tests, and variances.26
Flexibility comes from blurring the sharp edges of the regulatory
rules, not eliminating them. Thus individual property owners can be
relieved of specific regulatory burdens, or not, at the discretion of
legislators, administrators, and regulators. This blurring, rather than
erasure, of the rules produces a corresponding blurring of the land
owners' rights. The result is to eliminate the rights as rights and
replace them with tenures; privileges held of the sovereign, rather
than of right.
To briefly summarize, we have identified four important
differences between common law property rights and rights under
land use planning schemes:
26. See, e.g., RALPH E. BOYER, HERBERT HOvENKAMP, & SHELDON F. KuRTZ, THE LAW
OF PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCrORY SuRvEY 432-33 (4th ed. 1991) (outlining a nonexclusive
catalog of varying zoning regulations).
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(1) Common law property rights are negative rights; planning
requires positive rights;
(2) Common law property rights have origins outside the state;
planning regimes are creatures of political entities, and the rights
they create depend on political conditions;
(3) Common law property rights are created and defined
through an evolutionary process; planning regimes rely on fiat
rights defined in a discontinuous political process; and
(4) Common law property rights can be rearranged by private
transactions; fiat rights cannot.
The imposition of a land use planning regime onto a society of
property holders has the effect of transforming existing property
rights into a status equivalent in many respects to a feudal tenure.
Before exploring this further, we will illustrate the point with an
example drawn from a recent, all too typical court proceeding.
B. A Modern Property Rights Saga
The bundle of sticks held by modem American property owners
has been significantly reduced by regulatory statutes of various sorts,
particularly during the twentieth century.27 A property owner in 1900,
for example, who held a piece of property in fee simple absolute
owned almost any "stick" that could be included in the bundle.28 The
only major restrictions on his actions came from nuisance law and
voluntary agreements. Nuisance law restricted property owners'
ability to use their land in ways that interfered with other property
owners' ability to use their own land.29 This was a binding constraint;
common law courts often simply enjoined uses of land found to be a
nuisance, putting a halt to the offending landowner's activities unless
he paid off or bought out his neighbors. ° Landowners could also
contract away specific sticks from their bundle through covenants,
easements, and servitudes." Such rights were essentially permanently
"lost" unless repurchased from their new owners.
Property owners today hold a much smaller bundle of sticks. Zoning
and environmental restrictions, in particular, have removed many sticks
27. See generally Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of
Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEo. MASON L. REv. 923 (1999) (giving an overview of
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from the bundle." Perhaps most importantly, these restrictions are often
indeterminate, making it unclear exactly which sticks remain. We call the
resulting bundle of sticks, which are smaller and less well-defined than the
common law fee simple absolute bundle, "administrative property." To
illustrate, we first recount an example of this new form of feudalism.
In 1973 Lloyd Good purchased property on Lower Sugarloaf
Key, Florida, a part of Monroe County.33 In 1980, Good took steps to
develop about ten acres of his property for residential lots on canals
that would allow direct boat access.34 After hiring a firm to begin the
process of obtaining permits from various agencies, Good received a
permit from the Army Corps in 1983 that would allow some dredging
and filling of wetlands.35 The county government objected to the
permit, however, so the construction plans were amended and the
Army Corps issued a new permit in 1984.36 The new permit was to be
valid for five years, and subject to further Corps amendments.37 The
Corps insisted Good wait for further review, which resulted in a third
permit being issued in 1988, one that further reduced the construction
area.
38
During the eight years that the Army Corps evaluated matters,
Monroe County had instituted new restrictions on development to
make development "in harmony with natural ecology. 3 9 When Good
sought a building permit, the County rejected his request, saying it
had a moratorium on all major developments." Good appealed to the
Monroe Country Board of Adjustment and was rejected; his appeal to
the Monroe County Commission was successful, however, and Good
was issued a dredge and fill permit in 1984.41 A state agency, the
Florida Department of Community Affairs (DCA), then appealed the
County's approval of Good's permits to another state agency, the
Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (FLAWAC),
32. Traditional local zoning is being replaced by regional or state-wide land use planning.
Oregon, for example, adopted centralized control of all property in the state. PLANNNG THE
OREGON WAY: A TwENTY-YEAR EVALUATON (Carl Abbott et al. eds., 1994). Higher level
approaches to zoning have meant the introduction of increasing restrictions on land use.
33. Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Good v. United States, 39 Fed.
Cl. 81 (1997).
34. Good, 39 Fed. Cl. at 85.
35. Id. at 87.
36. Id. at 86.
37. Id.





which, in 1986, rejected the building plans.42 In the meantime, the
County issued new construction rules that posed new barriers for
Good.43 Good sued FLAWAC in state court. Although the state court
held in 1987 that the permit rejection was improper, it nonetheless
required Good to comply with the new Monroe County rules that had
gone into effect after the improper permit rejection."
Good prepared new development plans, which were filed in
1989."s Five months later, the County granted preliminary approval,
subject to approval also being granted by a third state agency, the
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD).46  Good
dutifully applied to SFW D.47  Six months later, in 1990, the
application was rejected.4" In the meantime, the preliminary approval
from the County expired since it had a one-year limit on its validity,
thereby requiring Good to begin a new application to the County.49
Good informed the Army Corps of his problems with state agencies
and scaled back his development proposal to the Corps in an
application filed in 1990.0
During the years Good spent in this regulatory labyrinth, three
species that live on Sugarloaf Key were added to the endangered
species list: a turtle, a rabbit, and a rat.' The listing now obligated
the Army Corps and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to take this
wildlife into account in evaluating Good's 1990 permit application. 2
The Corps and the FWS tussled over the matter, the Corps allowing
its permit to stand while the FWS recommended it be revoked
pending further biological studies.5 3 In 1991 the FWS released a new
biological study which urged further restrictions on construction."
Good responded in 1992 with an opinion by an environmental
consultant, who opined that the development would not have an
impact on the endangered species.5"
42. Id. at 88.
43. Id. at 87-88.
44. Id. at 88.
45. Id. at 88-89.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 89.
48. Id.
49. Id.




54. Id. at 91-92.
55. Id. at 93.
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In 1994 the Corps denied Good's 1990 application on grounds of
habitat loss for endangered species and notified Good that his 1988
permit had expired and would not be reapproved.56 Good sued the
federal government later in 1994, contending it had taken his property
for habitat protection.S7 Although in 1995 the FWS issued a report
that it would approve scaled back development (eight lots versus the
fifty-four originally planned), Good's Army Corps permits had all
expired and he proceeded with his suit.58 The Court of Federal
Claims then denied Good's claim because habitat protection did not
destroy all economic value.5 9 Good appealed to the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which, in 1999, also held against him.6"
Twenty-six years after the purchase of the land, and nineteen
years after beginning the permit approval process, the appeals court
held that Good had no suit for compensation, because he lacked
"reasonable, investment-backed expectations" that he would be able
to develop his property as he knew environmental regulations were
likely to become more stringent in the future.61 While none of the
relevant statutes or regulations blocking his development had been in
place when Good bought the property, the Court found that at that
time (1973) the Army Corps "had been considering environmental
criteria in its permitting decisions."6" According to the court, Good
thus had to know that "rising environmental awareness translated into
ever-tightening land use regulations."'63
No doubt Good was aware that the rules regarding development
were ever-tightening, although given that the delays in his
development all stemmed from government agencies, it is hard to
know what he could have done to speed things up. Nor do we doubt
that the decision of the court is correct; the Supreme Court has held
that unless a regulation destroys nearly all economic value of land,
there is no taking.' Hence, the odds of compensation being required
when "only" eighty-five percent of the building plans are eliminated
is very unlikely. Good's case is not unique; developers can repeat
many such stories.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 94.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 96, 114.
60. Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1362.
63. Id.
64. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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C. Administrative Property
As we described earlier, common law property rights and
comprehensive planning schemes differ in significant ways. Planning
has not (yet) displaced common law rights entirely. Rather it is
overlaid onto the pre-existing common law system. The resulting
hybrid has some characteristics of both. We use the term
"administrative property" to describe this new mixed form of land-
holding becoming more prevalent in the United States today.
Administrative property can be distinguished from common law
property rights in four ways:
(1) The bundle of sticks is smaller. For example, zoning
regulations restrict property uses; environmental regulations
prevent destruction or creation of wetlands without multiagency
approval; and endangered species regulations prevent harvesting
timber.
(2) The rights remaining in the bundle are underdetermined,
creating uncertainty about their contours. For example,
variances may be granted to zoning requirements," "trades" in
wetlands permitted,66 or agencies may demand dedication of land
to public use to gain acceptance of a plan.67
(3) Rights removed from the bundle are scattered among
multiple claimants, creating the danger of an "anticommons."68
Lloyd Good's rights, for example, were redistributed to an
alphabet soup of agencies, each of which had the ability to stop
his use of his land but none of which had sole authority to allow
the use of the land.
(4) Transaction costs among those holding rights from the
common law bundle are increased by the relocation of rights
from private hands to entities that must serve multiple
stakeholders and comply with expensive procedural due process
requirements. For example, development rights questions are
determined by local government units that must consider the
interests, among others, of taxpayers, contributors, landowners,
65. Osbome M. Reynolds, Jr., The "Unique Circumstances" Rule in Zoning Variances-
An Aid in Achieving Greater Prudence and Less Leniency, 31 URB. LAW. 127 (1999) ("Variances
are the principal administrative device for granting relief to individual property owners from the
unnecessary harshness of zoning laws.").
66. Kurt Stephenson et a]., Toward an Effective Watershed-Based Effluent Allowance
Trading System: Identifying the Statutory and Regulatory Barriers to Implementation, 5 ENVTL.
LAW. 775, 779 n.3 (1999) (describing wetlands banking).
67. See id. at 779 n.3-780 n.3.
68. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy ofthe Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622, 667-79 (1998).
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and neighbors. The transaction costs of contracting around
planning dictates, if allowed at all, are thus increased.
Moreover, even these reallocations of property rights from the
common law bundle are not fixed. Property owners must know that,
as they enter into nearly endless permit procuring processes, the rules
could tighten even more. As Lloyd Good discovered, one could well
be in a seemingly endless loop of federal and state regulatory agencies
offering conflicting rules.69 The result of these four differences is that
the permit givers are the parties who ultimately have the legal ability
to determine land use. People like Lloyd Good are therefore in a
position similar to that of a feudal serf, allowed to use a piece of a
federal-state estate for very limited purposes, with rights that may
change at the whim of one of many representatives of the "crowns."
70
In a nutshell, the general rule regarding governmental regulation
of private property is now that, so long as there is a statutory basis for
a regulation, and regulators have jumped through the appropriate
procedural hoops in writing and enforcing regulations under the
statutory authority granted to them by the federal or state legislature,
nearly any control may be imposed on any property. Only if there is
near total destruction of the value of the property by a change in
regulation need there be compensation under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.71 Thus, short of taking title to property or
69. There is generally no redress for land owners who incur massive bills for lawyers,
environmental consultants, permit specialists, and so on, all with no certainty in outcome.
70. The consequences of such administrative control over property can, at the extreme,
literally destroy a society. Ireland was long subject to administrative control from London, which
destroyed incentives to invest in property. The result was the potato famine, long-term grinding
poverty, mass emigration, and environmental destruction. TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST
TRMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES 243-56 (1998). While the economy
has recovered as stable and enforceable private property rights have taken hold, the social
consequences remain. For another survey of the consequences of uncertain private property
rights, see PipES, supra note 3. The arbitrary nature of the government is not simply the result of
a flawed institutional design. The dynamic created by administrative property requires that
enforcement contain an element of arbitrary power. Actions against property owners must draw
substantial attention. Property-holding serfs must be on notice that if they do not jump through
all hoops required by various emissaries of the crown, which may change at any time, it may be
off to the gaols. Jail is a real possibility. See United States v. Mills, CR 88-03100-WEA (N.D.
Fla. 1988), aff'd, 904 F.2d 713 (1lth Cir. 1990). Cross the line, fixed or not, and the value of
your property may be destroyed.
71. The most noteworthy case is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992). There, a reclassification of beachfront property formerly zoned residential construction
was changed to beach preservation, thereby prohibiting construction. Id. at 1006-07. The
Supreme Court held that the State of South Carolina had the right to change the classification of
the property but, by doing so, knew it was taking the value of the property and so had to provide
compensation for the loss Lucas suffered. Id. at 1027. With the exception of Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994), all Supreme Court taking cases in recent decades have dealt with
instances of near total destruction of property. In Dolan, where there was only a partial taking of
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destroying its economic value, agencies may, under a variety of
statutes, destroy most of the value of property or effectively force it to
be used for purposes favored by the agencies.
The threat of such regulatory action is enough to force many
landowners to "cooperate" in an effort to salvage some of their
property.72  Planners have discovered this and are enjoying great
success in persuading property owners to "donate" bike paths and
development rights in return for permit approval.73 Such a course of
action destroys the essential element of property rights, converting
them from a decentralized mechanism built around negative rights to
a centralized, fiat right.
But this is precisely the point, according to regulators. It is
because planners are able to consider the interests of multiple
stakeholders, balancing competing interests, that they are able to
transcend purely private interests and optimize property usage. If
planners could be relied upon to "get it right" this might not be as
catastrophic as it is. The nature of planning, however, means that
such an approach is doomed to failure. In the next section we address
the issue of how politics affects administrative property.
II. THE DEMANDS OF PLANNING
Because governments are political entities, it is necessary to
consider the role that politics plays in influencing land use planning
decisions. Administrative property is created by subtracting some
rights from the common law fee simple absolute bundle and
transferring those rights to government entities. Implementation of
planning is accomplished by the exercise of those rights through the
legislative and regulatory process. Even in the best case, with
benevolent and efficient political bodies and bureaucrats handling the
planning process, there will be significant information-related
problems that need to be addressed.
about one-seventh of Florence Dolan's property in exchange for a building permit, the Court
found a compensable taking by a 5-4 vote, but appeared to qualify this by focusing on poor
procedure on the part of the city. Certainly the courts since Dolan have not expanded the notion
of takings to cover partial property destruction by regulatory fiat.
72. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (describing attempted
exactions by state regulatory agency in exchange for building permits); Lars Noah, Administra-
tive Arm Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegation ofAuthority, 1997 Wis. L. REv.
873, 901-03 (1997) (noting that "exactions appear to remain an attractive regulatory device for
local land use officials and cash-strapped municipalities").
73. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Land Use Regulation and Environmental Justice, 30
EwvTL. L. RE'. 10,395, 10,406 (June 2000) (describing "exactions" that can be obtained from
developers in retum for approvals).
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In the real world, political pressure can also be expected to play a
major role in the structure of statutes that affect property values.
Special interests seek to enhance the value of their property by
providing special benefits to it, by imposing restrictions on
competitors' property that make it less desirable, or by simply seeking
to avoid bearing costs that are threatened by new rules; for example,
by being be grandfathered in so the new rules do not impinge on what
exists. The special interest nature of the statutory process cannot be
avoided, so those who seek to impose controls on property for
scientific planning purposes have a massive hurdle to overcome, as
they must convince legislators to ignore the interests that are a part of
the legislative process. This is, we believe, a utopian dream, but it
poses a serious problem that advocates of governmental scientific
property planning must address.
Given the general failure of central planning for economies, land
use planners must also offer one or both of the following arguments to
justify applying central planning to land use. First, they may argue
that using planning for a relatively small section of the economy will
not have the disastrous consequences of applying it to the entire
economy or that, even if such consequences exist, the costs imposed
by such planning will at least be exceeded by its benefits.74 Second,
they may argue that public planning for protection of the environment
differs from public planning for the production of bread in some
fashion that allows planning to perform better with respect to the
environment than it does with respect to bread. Note that it is not
sufficient merely to argue that market failures with respect to the
environment are more severe than those that may exist with respect to
bread. It is the relative performance of institutions that matters, not
the absolute performance of one possible institution. In light of the
century's disastrous experience with central planning, we suggest that
the burden of persuasion must be against planning and in favor of
markets.
However, let us turn to examining the possible justifications for
environmental (and other) land use related problems that can be
74. For justification of land use planning, see GEORGE B. DANTziG & THOMAs L. SAATY,
COMPACT CrrY: A PLAN FOR A LIVABLE URBAN ENVIRONMENT (1973); Robert H. Freilich &
Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183 (1997); Bruce Katz & Jennifer
Bradley, Divided We Sprawl, ATLANTc MONTHLY, Dec. 1999, at 26. Dantzig and Saaty, like
many planners, advocate "total-system models" to control city life. See DAN'ZIG & SAATY,




thought of as arising from various combinations of the following




" public goods; and
" failure to capture preferences.
Planning would thus be justified if one or more of these market
failures could be solved at an acceptable cost in the land use context.
In this Part we compare administrative and common law property
rights with respect to each of these market failures.
A. Complexity
Complexity prevents market solutions, planners argue, because
individuals are unable to understand the impacts of their actions.
People moving to "large-lot" suburbs, for example, set off a chain
reaction that decimates inner cities, increases pollution, destroys
farmland, and causes a host of other problems.75 Planning, many
claim, can do a better job.76
Before analyzing this claim, let us rephrase it so that we can be
clear about its implications. Those who decry "urban sprawl" are, at
base, asserting that private parties, left to their own devices, dealing in
real property with each other by contract under traditional property
law, cannot produce an "acceptable" ordering of people in their
physical locations.77 People will choose "inappropriate" locations that
75. See, e.g., William M. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of
hIstitutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 59 (1999) ("Urban sprawl causes many direct
and indirect societal and environmental harms.... Urban sprawl also threatens biodiversity and
contributes to transportation-caused air pollution and the deterioration of river water quality as
development destroys green areas, displaces agricultural uses, creates impervious surfaces and
adds to river discharges.... Abandonment of the urban core, which is both a cause and effect of
sprawl, increases disparities in wealth, housing, environmental, and business conditions.");
Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148
U. PA. L. REv. 873, 874 (2000) ("[U]rban sprawl threatens so much: quality of life (particularly
in our poorest neighborhoods), prime farmland, the environment, our historic and cultural
heritage, and our sense of community.").
76. See, e.g., James Poradek, Comment, Putting the Use Back in Metropolitan Land-Use
Planning: Private Enforcement of Urban Sprawl Control Laws, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1350
(1997) ("By integrating land-use control with other issues of governance, comprehensive
planning provides an efficient and legal method for municipalities to coordinate their needs and
resources.").
77. Note that a different argument is also possible and frequently made: current
government policies (taxes, regulations, spending) may be providing an incentive to engage in
environmentally damaging behavior. For example, subsidies to highway construction may be
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are inefficient and ecologically destructive.78 Because of this alleged
market failure, government planners at one or more levels must be
trusted, with appropriate citizen input, to force people, in their homes
and businesses, to favor certain locations and building designs over
locations and designs they might otherwise prefer. This is
accomplished by taxes, subsidies, and regulations that encourage or
require people to locate in certain places chosen by regulators or
forbid certain uses of property.79
Zoning and building regulations have long done some of this, but
those who believe urban sprawl should be prevented argue there must
be more than traditional building controls; more comprehensive
planning of land utilization is necessary.8" Without considering the
inevitable role of politics in such planning; presuming that planners
can do their jobs without special interest intervention; we contend that
the planner, no matter how well intentioned, how well informed, or
how intelligent, cannot do a better job than people will without such
direction. Why?
Complex problems require two commodities in short supply:
information and understanding. To improve on the decentralized
behavior of individuals, land use planners must understand the
problem sufficiently to design a solution, understand human behavior
sufficiently to implement the solution through a minimally intrusive
incentive structure, and understand the relationships in the rest of
society, particularly in the economy, well enough to ensure that there
are not unintended consequences.
Planning solutions address these information demands quite
differently than do markets. Planning requires that identifiable
individuals accumulate the necessary information and make decisions
promoting sprawl. Removing those distortions can eliminate the problem. This is different,
however, from creating new incentives in the opposite direction.
78. See, e.g., Charles B. Ferguson, Jr., Hamlets: Expanding the Fair Share Doctrine
Under Strict Home Rule Constitutions, 49 EMORY L.J. 255, 264-65 (2000) (attributing inefficient
commuting to urban sprawl and lack of mass transit).
79. See, e.g., EPA, Livable Communities Initiative-Better America Bonds, at
http://www.epa.gov/bonds (last updated Mar. 16, 2000); see also Karen M. White, "Extra" Tax
Benefits for Conservation Easements: A Response to Urban Sprawl, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 103
(1999) (advocating using tax code to promote conservation easements).
80. See generally PETER KAxz, THE NEw URBANISM: TowARD AN ARCHIrrECu OF
CoMMUNrry (1994) (defining "the new urbanism" as land use planning that incorporates
diversity, public space, and a structure conducive to pedestrian traffic and advocating through
case studies for such planning in the development of new sub-urban communities and the
redevelopment of existing urban centers); Reid Ewing, Is Los Angeles Style Sprawl Desirable?,
63 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 107, 118 (1997) (arguing that the solution to sprawl is active planning
which should be supplemented by policies that offer incentives for "good" development and
disincentives for "bad" development).
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based on that information that affect people today and tomorrow. To
decide whether the character of land use in a particular area should
change from residential to industrial, for example, a planner must
know what the alternative costs of housing are for the current
residents, the alternative costs of industrial property, how strongly the
residents feel about maintaining their current homes and
neighborhood, the impact on surrounding neighborhoods, and more.
The decision makers must then be sufficiently insulated from political
pressure and personal gain (e.g., exploiting their knowledge that a
decision is pending or accepting bribes) to ensure an objective
decision. They must be educated in the appropriate decision-making
techniques, told what factors can be considered, and so forth.
Markets and private property, on the other hand, rely on price
signals to give individuals the information necessary to make
decisions on a decentralized basis. Thus a property owner need not
know why his property has risen in price; he needs to know only that
someone is willing to offer him a price he is willing to accept to
purchase his property and devote it to an alternative use.
The complexity market failure that can justify planning is that
this price signal is insufficient because it fails to contain information
that the planner would consider relevant. For example, an individual
may not appreciate the significance of the wetland on his property to
migratory birds and so fill it in for another use.81 Solving this
information problem does not require removing the decision from the
marketplace, however. It requires only that entities enter the market
place with resources and seek to purchase the necessary rights to
preserve the critical wetland. Under those conditions the price signals
will reflect the demand for wetlands.82  Note also that the entire
bundle of rights need not be purchased, only the rights necessary to
accomplish the purpose at hand. Complexity is thus a reason to prefer
decentralized markets and common law property rights to planning
and administrative property, rather than the reverse.
81. See, e.g., Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993) (the EPA
prosecuted subdivision home builder for filling a one acre, bowl-shaped depression that "ponded"
during wet weather); see also Elaine Bueschen, Comment, Do Isolated Wetlands Substantially
Affect Interstate Commerce?, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 931 (1997) (describing controversy over the
EPA's assertion that such isolated wetlands were covered by the Clean Water Act).
82. Of course, not all wetlands will be preserved under such a system, but not all
wetlands are preserved under regulatory systems either.
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B. Ignorance
Private right holders lack knowledge of all impacts of their
decisions. This ignorance can be solved, it is asserted, by requiring
the expert advice of planners-advice that must be made mandatory if
it is to be uniformly implemented. Planners are certainly better able
than hundreds or thousands of private property owners to consult with
experts about many environmental features that could influence land
use. Do the economies of scale with respect to learning about general
scientific principles justify substituting planning for markets? No.
The ignorance critique misses the crucial insight offered by
economics into how markets process information. One major
advantage of markets over planning is that markets are able to process
knowledge through a decentralized mechanism. A property rights
holder need not know all that an expert knows about the
environmental features of her land; all that matters is that someone is
aware that learning about a particular type of feature could lead to a
profit-making opportunity. Such opportunities will draw entre-
preneurs, who will seek to exploit the property owner's ignorance.83
The ignorance story also fails to take into account the importance
of local as well as general knowledge. An environmental science
Ph.D. may well know more than suburbanite Smith about wetlands
ecology, but Smith, and his children who play on his property, know
much more about the specific parts of Smith's property than the Ph.D.
does. Planning substitutes general knowledge for local knowledge,
trading general ignorance for local ignorance. Educating a thousand
Smiths about the importance of wetlands can be done with a single
book or video, while educating scientists about local conditions on a
thousand plots requires a thousand studies, making the transaction
costs of overcoming local ignorance much higher than the
transactions costs of overcoming general ignorance.
C. Externalities
The externality market failure claim is among the most
common.84 The market fails to capture some effect of consumption or
83. The ignorance need not be ignorance about commercial value. It may be ignorance
about environmental amenities that others value, such as habitat for salmon, a rare plant, or the
dung beetle. By contracting for some or all rights in the property, those who value particular
environmental amenities may obtain them. For numerous examples, see TERRY L. ANDERSON &
DONALD R. LEAL, ENvIRO-CAPITAuSTs: DOING GOOD WHILE DOING WELL (1997).
84. Almost all economic textbooks assert that pollution is the major form of externality
and that externality is the major form of market failure. See, e.g., ROBERT B. EKELUND & ROBERT
TOLLIsoN, ECONOMICS 429 (5th ed. 1997) ("Market failure can occur on a global level. Pollution
114
LAND USE PLANNING
production of a good; as a result private and social marginal costs and
benefits diverge. The market-clearing price, where private marginal
cost equals private marginal benefit, is thus inefficient.
Of course such things exist. The examples range from the trivial
(we plant too few flowers in our gardens because we cannot charge
our neighbors to look at them) to the catastrophic (we bum too much
fossil fuel because we do not suffer when global warming raises the
sea level and Pacific Island nations shrink or vanish). The range and
breadth of externalities apparent to even undergraduate students in an
introductory economics class should immediately make us suspicious,
because the theory proves too much.8"
The missing piece of the externality story is a solution to the
problem which planners can implement. The textbook solution,
impose an optimal tax or subsidy, is riven with impossibly difficult
knowledge problems.86 Political reality aside, we argue that no such
solution exists because planners cannot adequately determine values
to substitute for market prices. To see why, consider how markets
generate prices.
Valuation of things, whether it be habitat preservation or home
construction, does not require direct or conscious valuation (pricing)
by all persons who benefit from such goods. The incentive structure
we call the market weaves uncountable decentralized individual
exchange relationships into an extensive web. Explicit valuations
only occur at the many events when an actual voluntary exchange
occurs. The results of these many revealed valuations are
communicated through what we know as the market, across time and
in many forms is a particularly ugly side effect of 'progress."); CAMPBELL R. McCoNNELL &
STANLEY R. BRuE, MICROECONOMICs 325 (13th ed. 1996) ("Pollution [is] the most acute negative
externality facing industrial society .... "); JOSEPH STiGLrrz, ECONOMIcs 507 (2d ed. 1997)
("One of government's major economic roles is to correct the inefficiencies resulting from
externalities. Among the many types of negative externalities, perhaps the most conspicuous are
those that harm the environment.').
85. It also proves too little. As far back as 1956, economists showed that, in the presence
of multiple externalities, one cannot know whether "solving" one will improve allocative
efficiency, even within the confines of neoclassical economic theory. See R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of SecondBest, 24 REV. ECON. STuD. 11, 11-12 (1956); Andrew
P. Morriss, Implications of Second Best Theory for Administrative and Regulatory Law: A Case
Study of Public Utility Regulation, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 135 (1998) (tracing the history of
second best theory).
86. All environmental economics textbooks have taught about the advantages of
pollution taxes for at least thirty years. See, e.g., EBAN GOODSTEIN, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENvmONMrENT272-76 (1995). Congress is certainly aware of its power to tax, but political reality
dictates command-and-control regulations, not taxes, are preferred by legislators responding to
special interests. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters' Profits and Political
Response: Direct Control Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 139 (1975).
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space, as signals to other market participants about what is most
desired. These signals serve as inputs into the decisions made by
current and potential market participants who may know nothing
about the details of particular transactions or the parties involved.
Market values are the unintended and undesigned results of
decentralized market activities that reflect the preferences and wealth
of the persons involved. Market participants confront prices of goods
and services which they are potentially interested in offering or
buying. When a person values a good, he does not determine the
market price of a good. Instead, as a supplier or a buyer, a person
chooses how much he will sell or buy, if any, given what others have
determined they are willing to sell or buy. Hence, determination of
market values is not in any one party's hands and is typically spread
over such a large number of persons that no one person has more than
a trivial effect on market values.
So while each person at each exchange intentionally chooses the
offer or acceptance price, in light of knowledge transmitted from
other market participants, it is not correct to say that market values are
consciously chosen. Consumers do not individually determine market
outcomes; those are the result of uncoordinated individual
determinations. Economic valuation is possible because no one
person or committee is responsible for determining the market value
of any good or service on the market.
If economic efficiency required consumers to value not only
their homes but all inputs that go into their homes, it would be
impossible for consumers to compute economically meaningful
values for these items. No consumer could know enough to value all
the inputs that go into the production of a single home. All each
consumer knows, and reveals by action, is how much he values a
particular home relative to all other choices that might have been
made.
Consumers rely upon suppliers because of the tremendous
wealth-creating advantages of the division of labor and specialization
so well explained by Adam Smith two centuries ago.87 While these
advantages are well understood, less appreciated is Nobel economics
laureate Friedrich Hayek's point about the division of knowledge.88
The competitive market process relies upon individual valuations,
many of which are done by specialists who focus on a part of the
87. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONSbk.1, chs. 1-2 (1776).
88. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REv. 519
(1945), reprinted in FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIvIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77-91 (1948).
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market, such as home construction or habitat preservation. Each
valuation specialist enjoys access to "knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and place" as they learn about the values that
others in the market possess.89
What economists call market prices cannot be derived by a
process other than by participation in a decentralized and competitive
market. Values or prices arrived at by any other means are not
comparable to the prices and values generated by persons interacting
freely. Most advocates of urban planning probably do not deny that
private provision of homes is efficient; there seem to be few
advocates of government production of housing. The concern usually
expressed is that the market will not provide enough environmental
amenities such as green space because the market does not know how
to provide such amenities, and that, in any event, less green space will
be available because of the large number of people who appear to
prefer to have their home on a parcel of private real estate that
consumes more space than some planning advocates would prefer.
Numerous arguments to this effect have been made to justify public
provision of green space. In essence they all boil down to a claim that
the market (i.e., people in the market) does not properly value the
existence of environmental amenities.9"
As we have seen, however, neither do planners. We are thus left
with a choice between "flawed" market prices and arbitrarily
determined nonmarket prices. There is no reason to systematically
prefer nonmarket signals to market signals (prices), since nonmarket
prices have more flaws and inflict costs on everyone subject to the
rule, rather than only the private participants paying for the
consequences of their imperfect decisions.
D. Failure to Capture Preferences
When not supposing that markets fail because private rights
holders are ignorant or face costs and benefits that differ
systematically from society's, planning advocates often argue that
environmental preferences are not given "room" in the marketplace."
People want green space, habitat protection, and so on. After all, they
vote for people who promise to get these things for them from the
political process. They just are not able to purchase such things in the
89. Id. at 84.
90. See Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29
ENVTL. L. 765, 780-82 (1999).
91. See DAVID RusK, INSIDE GAME OUTSIDE GAME: WINNING STRATEGIES FOR SAVING
URBAN AMERICA (1999).
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marketplace. Planning is therefore necessary to ensure that the
demands not met by the market are provided instead by the political
process.
Unfortunately, once again planning falls short. How do we know
if there is enough green space, territory for habitat protection, or some
other environmental goal? Unless we are willing to cede the decision
to an autocrat, it comes down to popular preferences. The problem,
then, is how to determine those preferences.
Markets operate by revealed preference; your actions in the
marketplace reveal your preferences through your purchases. If
people are offered small, efficient, low emission electric cars and
large, gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles, we can tell by what they
purchase which package of transportation services and environmental
protection they prefer. Similarly, if people have a choice between
high density urban housing and large-lot homes in the suburbs, the
relative prices of the two types of housing will reflect the relative
demand.
Planners, if they are to correct market signals, must by definition
rely on nonmarket signals. How much are people willing to pay for
such amenities? Polls indicate that a large majority of people would
like to see more environmental amenities. These polls may be
accurate, but still not reflect real values.9" Quality of governmental
protection of resources aside, let us focus on the question of whether
public provision of environmental amenities is justified because
citizens assert in opinion polls that there should be more green space
and whether the private sector cannot provide something that is, in
fact, valued.93
Preferences expressed by polling have little to do with true
valuation.94 Suppose a large number of people truthfully assert that
they would be willing to devote some small sum to assist in the
preservation of the Florida panther. Respondents to such questions
answer based on the assumption that the panther is the only
environmental amenity they will be asked to pay for, which is very
92. Of course, advocates assert that such polls are strong evidence that people would like
more environmental amenities, and since the market does not generate it, such amenities should
be provided through collective action at some level of government. President Clinton recently
ordered the creation of several new national monuments, expressing the belief that this is a
necessary role for government to play in order to protect environmental assets for future
generations.
93. It may be worth remembering, when citing poll numbers, that many citizens claim
they would support governmental control of the press. Distaste for the First Amendment does not
mean that censorship should be imposed because many people think the free press distasteful.
94. See Boudreaux et al., supra note 90.
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different than when people have to calculate simultaneously (and
know they must actually pay for) the values they place on all other
possible environmental amenities, such as green space, national
monuments, manatee habitat, tree frogs in Costa Rica, and thousands
of other possibilities. To have more accurate information about
personal valuation of environmental amenities, respondents must
simultaneously evaluate all relevant amenities, so they could calculate
how much they would be willing to pay for panther habitat, knowing
that they also wish to donate their personal resources to a multitude of
desired environmental goods. Further, such a schedule of values must
also include how much each person will spend on housing, taxes,
food, clothing, transportation, and other existing and future goods and
services already under consideration. This is a terribly complex
calculation, yet it is one we all make every day as we allocate our
resources to multiple purposes.
Valuing environmental amenities is no more difficult than
valuing green beans, movies, or church activities to which we choose,
or choose not, to devote resources. Those who happen to have strong
preferences for certain environmental amenities simply do not like the
fact that other people choose not to devote as much of their resources
to their favored amenity as they would like. But this is no different
than some other person's distress at the "failure" of the market to
provide a Somalian-food restaurant near where they live. The fact
that many people do not share our desire for particular goods or
public policies does not mean there is market failure or government
failure.
Not only are market valuations the result of uncountable
numbers of valuations of participants, but values are constantly
changing so that a snapshot of values today is not reflective of values
tomorrow. The essence of market activity is found in its
entrepreneurial dynamics and creativity. Prices change constantly to
reflect changed facts, values, and new opportunities. Unless resource
owners are allowed to react to changing values, market results will
not reflect the desires of market participants. If market reflection of
personal valuations is restricted, the allocation of resources grows
further and further out of kilter and individual freedom is reduced.
E. Public Goods
Another market failure story is built around the claim that
environmental goods are "public goods" and so underprovided by the
marketplace. Public goods are "[j]ointly consumed goods that are not
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diminished when one person enjoys their consumption. When
consumed by one person, they are also made available to others.
National defense, flood control dams, and scientific theories are all
public goods.""5
Public provision of certain services, such as national defense, has
long been assumed necessary because there is no other way to be
protected from invaders. The military may be an inefficient provider
of national defense, so the argument goes, but Microsoft and General
Motors are not going to produce national defense because people will
not volunteer to pay for enough defense. People (usually "other"
people) must be compelled to pay for national defense or we will not
have enough and may suffer a catastrophe. The same justification
may be posed for public provision of environmental amenities. The
government may be a bumbler in the production and provision of
services, but it is the only acceptable alternative; the other alternative
would be very few environmental amenities and little environmental
protection.96
Land use planning proponents often assert that environmental
amenities such as green spaces are public goods; that is, goods that
the private sector will "under produce" because buyers cannot capture
the value of their expenditures and because people will free ride on
purchases made by others rather than pay for the good. Assertions
that there is an under provision of environmental amenities are value
judgments, however. These judgments may be based on expert
evaluations, but they are still subjective assertions about how other
people should be forced to dedicate their resources via the public
sector.
We now know that scare stories about the USSR led to what can
be criticized as wasteful spending on the military for several
decades." Military leaders had strong incentives to overstate the
Russian threat. Larger budgets are preferred by heads of
bureaucracies such as the military. That aside, they would prefer
overinvestment so that, in the event of a conflict, under the
precautionary principle, they could not be blamed for underestimating
the enemy. Citizens are in a difficult position. Unlike private
providers, who compete with each other to sell us their goods or
95. JAMES D. GWARTNEYETAL., ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 130 (9th ed.
2000).
96. It assuredly isa bumbler. See, e.g., CHARLES WOLF JR., MARKETS OR GOVERNMENTS:
CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 36-99 (1988); David G. Davies, The Efficiency of
Public Versus Private Firms: The Case ofAustralia's Two Airlines, 14 J.L. & ECON. 149 (1971).
97. See BRIAN J. FINEGAN, THE FEDERAL SuBsIDY BEAST 83-117 (2000).
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services, thereby allowing us the benefit of multiple sources of
information, governments are often monopoly providers. Not only is
the United States military the only supplier of national defense to
United States citizens, it has, via Congress, the power to force us to
buy certain levels of military provisions. Even if we are sure we have
all the military we need, we cannot refuse the order of Congress to
pay for even more.
Planners who order the provision of environmental amenities,
such as green spaces, are not unlike military leaders. They will assert
there is not enough of the service they favor and that there are critical
reasons, environmental in this case, why we must allow ourselves to
be taxed or regulated more to pay for more public provision of such
goods. While there can be critics of such propositions, once the
legislature and its planning agents have spoken, all will pay, like it or
not. Public agencies pleading for more resources for environmental
amenities are no different than the Postal Service or highway
department or any other public monopoly provider with the power,
via the legislature, to coerce.
Suspicion of motives of public sector providers aside, is it true
that without public provision there will not be environmental
protection, such as green space preservation? The evidence does not
indicate that environmental amenities will be neglected. Around the
world there are for-profit and private nonprofit programs that provide
huge amounts of land to protect species and other resources that
humans believe are worth protecting.98 People specifically dedicate
billions of dollars worth of resources each year to what we call
environmental protection.99  Just as official measures of gross
domestic product (GDP) fail to include the value of housework, yard
work, and time devoted to charitable activities, measures of formal
environmental activities do not value environmental protection
provided by millions of property owners. That is, ordinary home
owners have strong incentives to enhance their property and its
environment, and protect it against depreciation, because prospective
property buyers value such amenities and because people simply like
to devote resources to such activities. Public planners do not need to
instruct property owners to protect their own environments. Simply
98. See, e.g., ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 83.
99. For numerous examples that cover a wide spectrum of activity, see Terry Anderson,
Viewing Wildlife Through Coase-Colored Glasses, in WHO OwNs Tm ENviRONmENT? 259-60
(Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 1998) (discussing habitat cultivation and protection areas
covering up to hundreds of thousands of acres in the United States and southern Africa that
private parties and tribes have pieced together).
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identifying a potential failure is thus an inadequate justification for
land use planning in the absence of a credible analysis of what
nonmarket information is available to correct the market signals.
I. THE CASE FOR COMMON LAW-BASED ENVIRONMENT
PROTECTION AND LAND USE DETERMINATION
If we are correct, then planning has some serious disadvantages
for land use issues. If it is the only alternative, however, we might
still be forced to rely upon it. What is the alternative offered by the
common law and markets? In this section we examine that alternative.
A. Common Law Property Rights Tools
The preceding section suggests that the standard justifications for
land use planning confront difficulties not generally acknowledged in
the planning literature. Planning does, however, offer one significant
feature that is not present in the common law-market regime:
planners can implement their preferred solutions relatively cheaply
because of their ability to take advantage of the coercive power of
government. Administrative property may be costly to property
owners, but it is cheap for planners. Does the common law of
property and markets offer any alternatives to coercive power for
solving problems? Yes.
The existing legal system, based on traditional property law, does
not restrict people from devoting resources to the provision of
environmental amenities. At law, there fs no limit to the kind of
arrangements that people may devise to protect and enhance property,
in any quantity, so long as there is no violation of public policy or of
the rights of other property holders. Conservation easements and
covenants, and other legal devices, most of which have existed for
centuries, are used to ensure environmental protection.0 0 The lack of
legal barriers, which allows people to effect their desires to protect
property for habitat or other purposes, means the market for
environmental protection operates quite freely and is subject to strong
legal protection.
Thousands of land conservation easements have been formally
established to prevent property from being developed or to limit its
use so that the habitat of certain species will be protected. Numerous
foundations, such as the Nature Conservancy, assist in such matters,
100. See, e.g., Gerald Komgold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy
Analysis in the Context ofln Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEx. L. Rnv. 433,442-43
(1984).
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although many of these foundations have become purchasing agents
for the federal government and do not keep the property in private
hands.'"' Besides such well-known foundations, there are hundreds of
local groups and thousands of private persons who have established
land trusts without formal coordination. The notion that all private
land is being plowed up for cookie-cutter housing development
simply does not square with what is happening and has been
happening for many years.1
02
Moreover, the experience of private environmental protection
efforts underscores the importance of the evolutionary nature of
common law property rights. By creatively identifying only those
aspects of property that are necessary to accomplish their
environmental protection goals, private groups are able to reduce the
cost of acquiring the necessary protection. In other words, by
carefully selecting the sticks from the bundle which they wish to
purchase, private conservation organizations and individuals can
lower the price of environmental protection while simultaneously
allowing the landowners to make economic use of the remaining
"sticks" in the bundle. Private entities acting in the marketplace have
a powerful incentive to so economize because it enables them to use
their scarce resources to acquire "sticks" from other bundles as
well.' 3
Compare this to the incentives for a government agency. Unless
it purchases land outright or totally destroys the land's economic
value, the agency pays nothing for the sticks it removes from the
landowners' bundles. Indeed, the only real constraint on planners in
such a situation is that they avoid depleting their political capital by
issuing too many unpopular regulations. Given the natural ignorance
of most voters about the content of statutes and administrative
regulations, this is a loose constraint indeed. Planners thus have little
incentive to narrowly tailor their regulations.
Planners can easily generate support for many restrictions on
land use because reductions in the supply of land available for
development drives up the value of existing developed property,
providing a boon to many existing owners of developed property.
101. Id.
102. See Robert Bruegmann, The American City: Urban Aberration or Glimpse of the
Future?, in PREPAR]NG FOR THE URBAN FrnuRE: GLOBAL PREssuRs AND LOcAL FORCES 336,
345-50 (Michael Cohen et al. eds., 1996).
103. See Louis De Alessi, Private Property Rights as the Basis for Free Market
Environmentalism, in WHO OwNs THE ENvmoNMEmr? 30 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds.,
1998).
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The costs are borne by a smaller number of property owners who face
development restrictions and by newcomers to the area searching for
housing. The poor tend to bear the burden disproportionately." 4
Traditional common law also provides strong protection for
property rights threatened by the actions of others. In recent decades,
popular discussion about matters that affect the environment,
including urban sprawl, has unfortunately come to center on public
policy. The common law is still there, however, and it is the most
relevant law for allowing people to construct the environment in
which they prefer to live. It offers strong protection against damages
inflicted on that environment by others.
Nuisance law provides the backbone of common law
environmental protection. It is a common sense notion that holds it to
be an actionable violation of the law for one party to invade another's
interest in the use and enjoyment of land.105 Such interferences must
be substantial and unreasonable or sufficiently noxious to give rise to
such an action, so that every trifle that bothers us does not rise to the
level of an action at law. When there is an actionable nuisance, there
may be damages to compensate for loss of use of the land, or loss of
enjoyment of the land, as well as injuries to one's health or loss of
family member services. They are, as Justice Sutherland said in a
famous bit of dictum, "a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in
the parlor instead of the barnyard.'
0 6
While most nuisance actions are brought by private parties
seeking to protect their property, public attorneys may also bring
nuisance actions on behalf of a large class of persons similarly
affected by a public nuisance." 7 Private land is also protected by
actions against trespassers, which includes a broad array of offenses
that invade one's property without permission. Juries hearing
nuisance and trespass cases tend to be harsh against invaders of
private property; each year some of the largest tort judgments in the
104. See, e.g., Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. & ECON. 71, 121
(1970) ("In general, a tenant will be better off mi [unzoned] Houston than he would be in a zoned
community. The availability of a great many building sites and the high density permitted has
probably resulted in a greater supply of every kind of rental accommodation, and a lower cost.').
105. Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern
Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REv. 923, 926-35 (1999). Nuisance cases go back at
least four centuries. A court in 1611 held the odor from a pig farm to be a nuisance and provided
the common maxim: "One should use his property in such a way as not to injure that of another."
Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817 (K.B. 1611).
106. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
107. BoYER, HoVENKAW, & Ku.Tz, supra note 26, at 404-05.
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nation are against invaders of private property."°8 The point of this
short discussion is that owners of private property have strong
protection available for their interests. That does not mean there will
not be catastrophes or invasions of interests, but there is a strong
standard of protection available which encourages people to invest in
land and its protection.
Private property rights and common law thus provide the means
to create voluntary transactions to protect environmental and other
values and the means to protect property rights against harm caused
by others. Because these means depend on the voluntary actions of
individuals, however, they will not solve every land use problem.
Some potential plaintiffs will decide to live with damage to their
rights because the cost of individual or collective action is too great or
because they opt to free ride on the efforts of others. Some
environmental goods will not find a space in the market because the
cost of producing them is too costly or because there is insufficient
demand for them. The question is thus whether the combination of
private property, common law, and markets does a better job than
central planning and administrative property at protecting these
values. We turn to that in the next section.
B. Private Solutions to Land Use Problems
As the Montana Land Reliance (MLR), one of many private land
trusts hot-linked to the Land Trust Alliance web site,10 9 explains, a
"conservation easement is the legal glue that binds a property owner's
good intentions to the land in perpetuity."1 0  The MLR holds
hundreds of easements on more than 300,000 acres of "ecologically
108. See, e.g., Margaret Cronin Fisk, Overall Awards Shrink But New Trends Emerge,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1998, at C2-3 (describing $3.6 billion New Orleans jury award for a
chemical leak from railroad cars that affected 8,000 persons); CASE: Sullivan v. Russell Corp.,
NAT'LL.J., Feb. 22, 1999, at CIO (awarding $52.56 million in Alabama for nuisance and trespass
suffered by five families due to contamination of a lake by textile plant dyes); Claims for Lost
Recreational Value in Environmental Litigation, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1998, at A17 (describing
$12.7 million California jury award for the tort of "lost recreational value" for beach damage
from oil spill; award of $215 million settlement in Montana for restoration of the Clark Ford
River Basin); Cyanide-Laced Wood Chips Poisoned Town's Public Land, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 28,
2000, at C9 (jury awarding property owners in Wisconsin $114.47 million against WEPCo for
leaving cyanide-laced wood chips hidden on land sold to others); 217.7 MAwarded Against
Rockwellfor PCB Runoff, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at A15 (awarding $218 million in Kentucky
against Rockwell International for PCB contamination of water).
109. See The Land Trust Alliance, Land Trusts, at http:llwww.lta.orglmap/MT.htm (last
visited Sept. 15, 2000).
110. The Montana Land Reliance, An Introduction to Conservation Easements, at
http://mtlandreliance.orgleasements.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2000).
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important land. '11 It notes that in conservation easements, which are
individually tailored to meet the needs and desires of each owner of
property involved, agriculture and silviculture may be allowed to
continue, subject to the terms of the enforceable agreement between
the land owner and the MLR, which gives the MLR the right to enter
easement areas to monitor activities."' Activities that the MLR
specifically prohibits are subdivisions for residential or commercial
activity, construction of nonagricultural buildings, nonagricultural
commercial activity, strip mining, or dumping of toxic or
noncompostable waste.'13 When property is dedicated to certain
environmental uses, it usually results in an income tax write-off for
the property owner or donor and a reduction of estate and gift tax
duties, thereby further encouraging such action."4
The MLR is a successful land trust, although not nearly as large
or well known as many environmental groups. Many people have
dedicated their wealth and property to give the MLR enough assets to
have offices in three towns in Montana and to write an average of
forty new easements each year. Not only the rich engage in such
behavior; there are numerous community efforts that bring together
people, usually of modest means, who wish to help preserve their
slice of the environment. For example, the Green Horizon Land Trust
has been operating out of Lake Wales, Florida, since 1991.2" With
easements on about 900 acres, it focuses on preservation in Polk,
Osceola, and Citrus counties." 6 Its sites include the Cowpen Slough
Preserve, thirteen acres in Polk County that is habitat for many
wetland plant species and numerous birds."7 Another site in Polk is
the Scrub Plum Preserve of six acres, which is used as an outdoor
classroom for the students of Babson Park Elementary School." 8 The
Van Fleet Trail site of eighteen acres is being donated to Polk City to
use as a public park."9
The experience of the Green Horizon Land Trust is not unusual.
Some land it oversees primarily for species habitat preservation, some
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it manages as private parks, some it has deeded over to various state
or local agencies for their management. 2 ' The lands were obtained
by market-price purchases, bargain sales, donations, easements or
other private contractual arrangements. There is no limit to the
ingenuity that people may use in constructing property transfers or
restrictive agreements to meet environmental objectives by the parties
involved. No governmental oversight is required for such activities to
occur. Indeed, as with all market activities, we posit that there will be
more creative and diverse environmental protection when it is left to
private parties than if it is directed by government.
C. Advantages of the Common Law
The decentralized system of common law property rights and
markets offers several positive advantages over centralized planning
and administrative property. In this section we discuss those
advantages.
1. Incentives for Decision Makers
Government-run environmentalism is no different than
government-run military. Having the EPA as the nation's environ-
mental czar produces the same kind of problems as having the
Pentagon as the nation's military czar. The same institutional
arrangements that resulted in (true) stories about $700 hammers and
$6,000 coffee pots are expected magically not to suffer from the
politics and incentives of the federal bureaucracy when it comes to the
environment."' But there is no difference. The same Congress and
the same administrations under political control respond to a host of
special interests as billions of dollars are doled out, and scores of
regulations are issued, to command and control the environment.
While a centralized military may be justified because of the
nature of national defense, that is not the case when it comes to
habitat protection in Polk County, Florida. The folks at the Green
Horizon Land Trust know more about, and care more about, the
environment where they live than can the EPA employees in
Washington, D.C., Atlanta, or Florida; the State of Florida employees
in Tallahassee; or even the employees in Polk County. It is not that
the employees of the various governments are ignorant or uncaring.
Government employees work for legislators, who have imperfect
knowledge and who must respond to a host of special interests. Even
120. Id.
121. See FINEGAN, supra note 97.
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if special interests could be put aside, which they cannot, no
government agency can direct matters better than people on the
ground can direct them for themselves. Central planning consistently
produces a one-size-fits-all result. If you prefer size 42 suits, black
only, you are in luck."'
2. Avoiding Mistakes
Every generation acts as if it possesses the wisdom of the ages.
When we decide how to allocate our resources, we do it with a host of
constraints, including what we think to be correct information and the
most appropriate social values. So long as we only command our
own resources, we cannot do much damage to others. But when,
through the governmental process, we command everyone today and
in the future to dedicate the resources of many to one set of rules, we
play the role of environmental gods; sure that our wisdom is best for
today and tomorrow. Let us consider two examples, one small and
one big, of environmental action, that indicate that what the majority
thinks is right may not always be so.
A century ago, hawks were considered vermin because they
preyed on other birds. Not only did farmers hate "chicken hawks"
because they killed chickens, free range or not, even the Audubon
Society promoted the eradication of eagles, hawks, falcons and other
such birds because they killed song birds.' Governments paid
bounties for the killing of chicken hawks (and wolves) because wise
public policy dictated that these pests be eliminated.'24
Raptor killing reached hundreds, even thousands, on a single fall
day at Hawk Mountain in Pennsylvania.12 A conservation-minded
woman, Rosalie Edge, differed from prevailing opinion.'26 She
wanted to save the vermin. Not wealthy, she scraped together a few
hundred dollars, leased hundreds of acres on Hawk Mountain, prime
raptor grounds, and barred hunting from the area.'27 She eventually
122. Political control of environmental assets literally produces such results. Yellowstone
National Park is biologically sterile after a century of management by the federal government.
See Charles E. Kay, Yellowstone: Ecological Malpractice, 15 PERC REPORTS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1
(June 1997). National Forests, under United States Forest Service control, are similarly
biologically threatened. See Holly Lippke Fretwell, Forests: Do We Get What We Pay For?, in
PUBLIC LANDS SERIES, PERC (1999).
123. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 83, at 44.
124. The government still pays bounties for elimination of "undesirable" species. J.
Bishop Grewell, War on Wildlife: Government Subsidized Animal Destruction, PERC WORKING
PAPER (2000).
125. ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 83, at 44.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 44-45.
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purchased the mountain side and created a sanctuary to save them.'28
Located in the Appalachian Mountains of eastern Pennsylvania,
hundreds of thousands of hawks migrate past Hawk Mountain each
autumn. 129  Once a killing field, Hawk Mountain Sanctuary has
become an internationally known conservation, education, and
research organization.'30
Rosalie Edge was considered a nut in her day. The woman was
devoted to protecting vermin! Imagine her reception if she attempted
to persuade the "Raptor Eradication Board" to save the hawks. Yet
her efforts-one person going against prevailing wisdom and public
policy-created the Hawk Mountain Sanctuary and Association. 3 ' It
is funded from membership dues, visitor fees, and private
contributions.1 12 Today Rosalie Edge is hailed as a wise person. We
do not know if she was wise or not. She simply did what she thought
was right. She provides us one example of how land ownership can
conserve landscapes and protect wildlife if even one individual is
committed to preservation. '33
A second, larger scale example illustrates the danger of putting
the power of the government behind an environmental objective.
Today we know the Florida Everglades to support a rich and unique
array of plant and animal life.'34 It existed, largely undisturbed, for
thousands of years until a century of wise public policy attempted to
destroy it.'35 Before state and federal policy devoted substantial sums
to attempt to drain the Everglades, there were various private efforts,
but none were successful because the value of the Everglades,
drained, was too low to cover the cost of the enterprise.'36
Beginning with the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850,
the federal government authorized the state of Florida to push for
drainage of swamps.'37 By complying with the Act, the state gained
title to more than twenty million acres of land (otherwise the state
would today look like a Western state, largely under Bureau of Land
Management control).'38 The state encouraged swamp drainage
128. Id.





134. See Clay Landry, Unplugging the Everglades, PERC WoRKING PAPER (2000).
135. See id.
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137. Id. at 2.
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through the Internal Improvement Fund (W), which provided state
bonds and taxing power to subsidize Everglade development.'39 The
IIF saga, which lasted for decades, brought financial ruin to the state
and private developers lured by the subsidies.1
40
Decades of effort drained less than a million acres prior to the
New Deal, which ordered the Army Corps of Engineers to assault the
Everglades.141 During the middle of the twentieth century, federal
money poured in to build dams, canals, and other projects that
produced what we see today, with about ten million acres affected.
42
The Nixon administration began to slow the flow of federal dollars as
environmentalists began to complain of the damage to the
environment.1
43
Today we know that the swamp drainage policies were
destructive. A multibillion dollar federal plan is on the table to
rework canals and levees to try to undo some of the damage to what
we now call precious wetlands, not fetid swamps." Going against
public policy that dominated for over a century was the Florida
Federation of Women's Clubs. 4  They convinced the Model Land
Company to set aside Paradise Key, a hummock fifteen miles from
Homestead, that was popular with birders and other tourists.146 It led
to the creation of Royal Palm State Park, which was privately run and
operated until destroyed by hurricanes in the late 1920s, at which time
the land was turned over to the tender mercies of the federal
government. 47  Compounding the environmental problem in the
Everglades are the various federal sugar subsidies, which artificially
increase the price of sugar grown in the United States, so that all
consumers can contribute to the sugarcane operations that might not
otherwise exist in central Florida.1
48
Why has this state of affairs persisted for so long? Are members
of Congress and various administrations not aware of this
environmental mess? Of course they are, but they face a host of
special interests, such as the sugar growers who have been generous
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 8-15.
142. Id. at 11-13.
143. Id. at 14-15.
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campaign supporters over the years. 149  Such powerful special
interests, and their employees, are not to be lightly discarded. There
is nothing evil in any of this, it is just the political process at work.
The story describes just one of the many conflicting forces that come
together when resources are commanded by edict from Washington,
rather than by people on the ground who must pay for their decisions.
People make mistakes. They destroy resources in futile efforts to
make failing enterprises succeed. But the cost of these mistakes, from
which many learn, is small compared to the costs of having resources
controlled by central planners and their legislative overseers who tend
to engage in massive, lumbering projects, such as Everglades
drainage, that are harder to stop than an oil tanker headed for the
rocks. Public policy rarely allows different values to be expressed;
one set of values is imposed on all and all taxpayers get to share in the
costs, whether they like it or not. Even worse may be the loss of
information that occurs when resources are centrally commanded.
Diversity allows not only freedom of expression of values, but allows
others to learn from the choices, good and bad, that others make. In a
planned regime, all pay for and get the same results, and we know
little of what might have been.
"But we are different," modem planners may insist. We are
attempting to preserve, not to destroy the environment. If we prove
wrong, reversing our mistakes will not require undoing development
but merely opening up protected areas. It may be that humanity has
finally unraveled the secrets of the environment sufficiently that we,
unlike our parents and grandparents, will not make such costly
mistakes as draining the Everglades or hunting hawks to the verge of
extinction. Perhaps, unlike our feudal ancestors, we are all-knowing
and all-seeing. History suggests otherwise, however.
Moreover, "preservation" is not what modem environmental
policy pursues with such single-minded energy. We are not simply
"banking" land and natural resources. Even when we merely lock one
source of resources like the oil of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
in a vault, we encourage more intensive exploitation of other,
potentially more sensitive areas. More dangerously, each time we ban
trafficking in endangered species, like the Atlantic Green Sea Turtle,
we risk devastating private sector efforts to save those very species,
like the Cayman Turtle Farm. Today's mistakes will be different from
yesterday's, if we can learn from history, but there is no guarantee we
have traded false negatives for false positives.
149. See id.
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D. Environmental and Land Use Creativity
For the environment to be protected and for people to have
spaces to enjoy, there must be experimentation so we learn more
about the environment, what works, and what people prefer. This will
not happen with command-and-control of the environment. The EPA
or any other agency, no matter how well intended, cannot possibly be
as creative as people living on the ground and working in their
environments.
The national parks, often talked about as sacred grounds, are in
dreadful environmental condition.!5" The crown jewels of the park
system, such as Yellowstone, are environmental messes ecologically
and for the users."' The people who work for the Park Service at
Yellowstone are not ill-intending or lazy. The problem is that their
incentives are wrong. Yellowstone rangers work for bosses in
Washington, who order them not to shoot bison to avoid publicity in
newspapers in Boston and New York, where people get teary-eyed
about bison.' 2 So the park managers let bison starve to death rather
than cull the herd. Yellowstone has so many visitors, compared to the
facilities in place, that raw sewage is dumped into pristine trout
streams.'53 Those spills occur while outhouses that cost $300,000 per
hole are being built.'54 The people who work at the park would never
make such foolish decisions, but their far-away bosses in Washington
force such things to occur. No member of the administration or
Congress who oversees the park wants these things to happen; this is
simply what happens when people command resources they do not
own and for which they ultimately are not responsible. The other
problem is the same one faced by the bureaucrats in Moscow
responsible for bread production. They did not want wheat to go
ungrown or wasted, but nonetheless disastrous shortages occurred.
The lack of creativity in public land management stands in stark
contrast to developments in the private sector, which gives us clues
about the wide array of environment-enhancing developments we can
expect to see more of, so long as people are willing to pay for it and
environmental entrepreneurs are not stymied by reams of government
regulations.
150. For an extensive discussion of mismanagement of Yellowstone, see ALSTON CHASE,
PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE: THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK (1986).
151. Seeid. at6.




The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, charged with assisting
species preservation, has spent large sums reintroducing wolves into
the greater Yellowstone area, since a previous generation's
government policies of bounties and government hunters eradicated
the wolves.' 5 The plan, and the many public hearings that preceded
it, generated controversy and ill will in the area. In short, many
ranchers believed they would be forced to subsidize the predators,
which would kill lambs and calves." 6 Environmental activists (and
newspaper editorial writers) sneered at the selfishness of the
ranchers." 7
While that controversy was swirling, the Defenders of Wildlife
(via their office in Montana) took another tack.' They sold prints of
wolves howling in Yellowstone and raised about $100,000." 9 They
then announced that they would pay ranchers who lost livestock to
wolves. 6 When a rancher suspected a kill, the Montana Department
of Livestock was called. 6' If its inspector said the kill was due to a
wolf, Defenders would accept that judgment and pay the rancher the
market value of the lost livestock.'62 In effect, Defenders accepted
liability for the cost of the wolves. While they do not own the
wolves, their liability for costs inflicted by wolves reduced the
opposition of ranchers to their presence. '63 The ranchers were not
forced to feed the wolves for free.
The program did not turn out to cost very much. After a decade
less than half the money collected from the sale of prints had been
paid to ranchers.16 So Defenders announced that it would pay
bounties to property owners who identified verified wolf dens on their
property thereby encouraging ranchers to let wolves breed in peace.165
These payments allow those concerned about wolf habitat to
effectively provide the habitat, at their expense, across a huge area
involving many land owners. Individual contracts with each property
owner would be very costly, but the simple act of volunteering to
155. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483,488 (4th Cir. 2000).
156. Id. at489.
157. See, e.g., Let Them Come Back, L.A. TIES, Nov. 4, 1987, at 7; Welcoming Wolves
Back to the West, CHI. TRm., July 8, 1994, at 16; Will Yellowstone Be a Home for Wolves?, ST.
Louis Posr DISPATCH, Dec. 18, 1994, at 2B.
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accept costs imposed by the predators significantly reduced traditional
hostility toward wolves. Even more importantly, the Defenders'
program allowed continued use of the ranchers' land, which would
not be the case if it had been seized to be added to the Park.166
The multimillion dollar federal program, on the other hand,
offers no solace to ranchers whose livestock feed federal wolves.
Since shooting a wolf is a federal offense, the best policy is "shoot,
shovel and shut up." Property owners are put at war with the
environment, especially with endangered species, the presence of
which could lead to federal mandates to curtail economic use of
private property.167 The Defenders' program revealed that when
private actors, faced with real costs, creatively approach a problem,
the cost of habitat protection may not be nearly as high, or as highly
charged with emotions, as either side believed.
Similarly, but on the other end of species use, hunting contracts
provide higher quality habitat for elk in Montana, Arizona, and other
prime hunting states. 68 Elk on public lands have been decimated, so
hunting is bad and the quality of elk may be declining as the prime
bulls are the first targets of hunters looking for trophy elk. 1 69 Unlike
in the good old days, when people could pretty much hunt where they
wished, most ranchers and farmers have posted their lands against
hunting to keep out the increased number of hunters chasing smaller
numbers of elk. 70 Hunting associations have contracted with multiple
landowners for rights to hunt elk on private land.17' The landowners
have incentives to allow the herds to stay healthy so the hunters will
pay healthy fees to the landowners. While many hunters are
distressed at what they are sure is a constitutional right to hunt elk for
free (or for the low price state elk tag), fee hunting is allowing
hunting to persist while protecting wildlife. 72 The best quality elk
hunting in the United States today is on the White Mountain Apache
Indian Reservation in Arizona, where the tribe (after kicking out the
State of Arizona) sharply limited hunting to allow elk herds to grow
166. Id.
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and mature.'73 Sales of hunting rights are now a major source of tribal
income and the elk have never been healthier. 74
Will people pay to protect ducks they are likely to never see?
Many would say ducks are classic public goods: nearly anyone (with
a gun and a state hunting license) can shoot ducks, which range over
huge areas, migrating from Mexico to Canada. Yet Ducks Unlimited
and the Delta Waterfowl Foundation raise tens of millions of dollars a
year in contributions from people who like to duck hunt.175 A donor
in Texas may be "paying" for pothole preservation in Manitoba that
will benefit some ducks the donor/hunter never sees. The result of
this private action is that the waterfowl population of North America
may be higher now than ever.'76 Side benefits of private efforts to
increase the number of ducks include wetlands conservation and
restoration, which benefits many species besides ducks.'77 Private
groups have managed to provide significant amounts of a "public"
good because they have figured out how to do so cheaply, through
creative use of property rights. Just as importantly, private
organizations such as Ducks Unlimited are able to convince donors
their donations will be put to good use, a promise governments find
hard to keep.
Similar efforts in Zimbabwe to protect elephants are underway.
Elephants, a favorite of zoo visitors, are no joy to their neighbors in
Africa who face crop and housing destruction from these huge
beasts.'78 Elephants also trample a number of people to death each
year.'79 In Kenya, where elephants are declared to be a "national
treasure" and "protected" by the government, poaching has driven the
numbers of living elephants to a small fraction of years ago, despite
ever-escalating government measures to protect elephants-including
"shoot to kill" orders that have produced hundreds of dead poachers
but no decline in dead elephants. 8 In Zimbabwe, by contrast, natives
have incentives to protect elephants from poachers, and to even
tolerate crop loss, because they capture some of the economic value
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of the elephants.' 8' Hunters will pay huge fees for the right to shoot a
bull elephant; and, of course, tourists like to see the elephants afoot.'82
By allowing native villages to share in hunting fees and work with
tourists, the animals are transferred from pests into assets." 3
Some animal lovers believe it obscene to shoot elephants.
Unless they are willing to go where the animals live and outbid other
uses of the animals, however, the evidence is clear, from elephants
and many other species, that if people on the ground have reason to
want the animals to live, they will live and prosper. On the other
hand, if indigenous people see the animals as a deadly pest, not an
asset, no amount of weeping by well-intended people with Save the
Elephant stickers on their cars will do anything to actually help the
animals, regardless of the superior feeling it gives the buyer of the
sticker.
IV. CONCLUSION
We face a choice today between two visions of property rights:
William the Conqueror's and the common law's. How we make that
choice will determine whether we find ourselves performing the
modem equivalent of "a leap, a whistle and a fart coram domino
rege' 184 for bureaucrats and agencies, or whether property rights will
act as a protective wall against the heavy hand of government.
Environmentalism is serious business. People are willing to pay
for habitat and green spaces for humans when offered credible means
of doing so. The real work of environmentalism means on-the-ground
work preserving habitat for species, including human usage. It means
inventing new methods of improving habitat and new ways to allow
multiple uses of habitat. The evidence is that central planning of
environments, as in national parks and forests, produces dreadful
environmental results. There is no reason to suspect that city planners
can make any better use of habitat for humans than the humans living
in those cities will sort out for themselves.
An even more powerful point has to do with the critical nature of
private property rights. As Harvard historian Richard Pipes discusses
in his recent book, Property and Freedom, the history of the world,
over many nations and centuries, indicates that without strong private
property rights, it is unlikely that there will be either personal freedom
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or economic advancement. The alternative to freedom, of course, is
government control. The last century witnessed "disturbing
developments ... that have enabled governments, in the name of
social justice and the 'common good,' to abolish or infinge on
property rights and, by so doing, sometimes abolish and often restrict
individual freedoms."'85 We are no different from other peoples in
other times. We are not blessed with a superior intellect that allows us
to avoid the tragedies of central control; the tragedies which follow
from dreamy promises that help bring central control to fruition. As
we work to ensure a better quality of life for our children, the best we
can do is leave them more freedom and wealth to develop their world.
We should not tie them to the arrogant presumptions that our
generation is sure are the work of the best and the brightest.
185. PiPEs, supra note 3, at 282.
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